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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, news of a water crisis in Flint, Michigan, shook the nation.'
Tests conducted after months of public complaints confirmed
investigators' worst fears: the city's taps contained dangerously high levels
of lead and had poisoned people for years.2 A wave of studies soon
revealed that tens of thousands had been exposed to the neurotoxin.
Children were among those most severely affected.4
The crisis shed light on a city and state in disrepair. To prevent Flint
from going bankrupt after the Great Recession, Michigan's Governor had
appointed an emergency manager who reduced costs by pulling water
from a nearby river.5 The river's corrosive water leached lead off the aging
pipes that carried it across the city.6 Residents quickly notified officials of a
decrease in water cleanliness.7 However, Michigan's Department of
Environmental Quality had been hollowed by years of austerity and failed
to respond.8
Seasoned observers blamed the disaster on inadequate tax revenues.
As former state treasurer Robert Kleine put it, "the crisis was decades in
1. See Ryan Felton, Flint's Water Crisis: What Went Wrong GUARDIAN (Jan. 16,





5. See Ryan Felton, Governor Rick Snyder 'Very Sorry'About Flint Water Lead
Levels Debacle, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:54 AM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/dec/30/michigan-governer-rick-snyder-very-sorry-
about-water-supply-debacle [https://perma.cc/VCC8-JFBC].
6. See Ted Roelofs, Signs of Trouble at MDEQ, Years Before Flint Lead Crisis,








the making."' He pointed to tax limits passed in the 1970s and 1990s,
which constrained the state's ability to fund infrastructure and health
inspections.10 The situation only worsened in the years preceding the
water crisis. In 2011, to offset a $1.6 billion business tax cut, Michigan's
Governor curtailed the tax revenue the state shared with municipalities-
money that cities like Flint relied on to stay solvent."
Sadly, Flint's story is emblematic of a much larger trend. American
states have underinvested in infrastructure, education, and public welfare
for decades.'2 While the growing costs of certain state programs have
accounted for part of the problem, stagnant and more volatile tax levies
have also contributed to the lack of funds for public services. Surprisingly,
however, scholars have devoted little attention to the latter problem. This
Note begins to fill that void by proposing a new research agenda.
From the 1930s to the 1970s, states invested in public services that
fostered opportunity for each of their residents. States partnered with the
federal government to build the infrastructure that twentieth-century
businesses and their workers needed to thrive. States bolstered
expenditures on high schools so that a majority of people could earn the
credential for a well-paying job. In anticipation of the technological
revolutions that would soon reshape their labor markets, states poured
vast sums of money into higher-education systems that equipped millions
with advanced skills. Finally, states developed a suite of social policies that
kept families healthy and out of poverty.
Since the late 1970s, however, states have taken a dramatic turn.
Though their populations have continued to grow at an impressive pace,
states have tapered the investments needed to guarantee broad social
mobility. Lawmakers have slowed infrastructure maintenance and
eschewed new construction, leading America's roadways, buildings, and
water systems to fall into disrepair. State spending on primary and
secondary schools has failed to keep up with the growing number of
children, necessitating oversized classes and prompting teacher shortages
that have reduced education quality for the poorest students. States have
steadily defunded public colleges by requiring tuition increases that have
9. Robert J. Kleine, Former Treasurer of Michigan: The Flint Water Crisis was




11. See Rachel Richards & Alicia Guevara Warren, Enough is Enough: Business
Tax Cuts Fail to Grow Michigan's Economy, Hurt Budget, MI LEAGUE FOR PUB.
POL'Y 1, 7 (2015), http://www.milhs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Enough-is-Enough-BusinessTaxCuts.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GR-LVED].
12. See infra, Section I.B.
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diminished access to higher education. Finally, states have struggled to
adequately fund public health services.
States' move from investment to retrenchment remains an enigma.
Existing research has focused on the ways in which competing budget
commitments have crowded one another out. For instance, researchers
have shown that rising Medicaid costs have put pressure on funds
available for other programs. There is also growing evidence that prison
outlays and high infrastructure prices have drawn money away from
welfare projects. Yet the scale of states' spending shortfalls and their
consistency across budget areas suggest that other forces have also been
at work. These two elements imply that states have faced severe,
structural budget deficits. As such, they point to a conspicuous culprit:
insufficient revenue.
A close look at the data confirms that states have confronted two
major revenue challenges in the past forty years. First, unlike polities that
. have maintained healthy economies and robust investments in public
services, American states have allowed their long-run tax receipts to
stagnate. Second, states' tax hauls have become more volatile in recent
decades. Just as they do with the spending side of the equation, scholars
must analyze the origins of these revenue problems. In particular, they
must probe howtax laws have led to suboptimal revenue growth and why
legislators have allowed tax systems to underperform.
Prior work in economics and political science has provided a
foundation for addressing these questions. With respect to the first, past
studies have pointed to the roles of four legal institutions:13 laws actively
limiting states' tax hauls; withering sales tax regimes; eroding corporate
tax bases; and multiplying tax expenditures. With respect to the second,
the literature has stressed the rise of organized interests that have lobbied
to diminish taxes across the states. Further probing and combining these
strands should yield a wealth of research questions in the coming years.
It bears emphasizing that this Note does not provide a definitive
account of states' tax histories over the past four decades. Indeed, no
individual study could do so. It instead seeks to bring attention to an area
13. This Note adopts a broad definition of "institutions" borrowed from neo-
institutional approaches in economics and political science. Specifically, the
term refers to "the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations
organized by rules, norms, and strategies," where the word "rules"-which
encompasses formal laws of the kind legal scholars usually focus on-means
"shared prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually
understood and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents
responsible for monitoring conduct and imposing sanctions." Elinor Ostrom,
Institutional Analysis and Development: Elements of the Framework in
Historical Perspective, in HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEORETICAL




of law that has remained underexplored for too long. It also aims to arm
researchers with the conceptual tools needed to uncover which tax
institutions have decreased state revenue and why tax laws have evolved
to promote this outcome-histories that undoubtedly vary richly across
states, policy domains, and time periods.
To elaborate the foregoing arguments, the discussion proceeds in four
parts. Section I charts the shift in states' commitment to public services.
Section II shows that insufficient tax revenues bear some of the blame. It
further notes that legal scholars have yet to address this problem despite
the link between states' tax codes and the funds they raise. Section III
draws on recent work in economics to unearth stagnant and unstable
revenues' legal origins. Finally, Section IV invokes theories of policy
change to hypothesize these laws' political determinants.
I. AMERICA'S STRUGGLING STATES
This section traces the rise and fall of states' investments in critical
public services. American states are hidden engines of economic
prosperity. They finance three-quarters of the nation's infrastructure.1 4
Along with localities, they take primary responsibility for providing public
elementary, secondary, and tertiary education.15 States also administer a
host of health and welfare programs.1 6 Nonetheless, they tend to receive
less scholarly attention than the federal government.
States became more difficult to ignore after the Great Recession. By
devastating states' budgets, the crash spurred public service cuts so deep
that they hampered the national recovery.7 More importantly, the
downturn showed that states' woes extend well beyond a single crisis.18 As
analysts have begun sifting through the data, it has become clear that state
14. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK
FORCE 6 (2012), https://www.theindustrycouncil.org/publications/State
BudgetCrisisTaskForceFullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVX2-FDJC].
15. See Nicholas Johnson & Michael Leachman, Four Big Threats to State
Finances Could Undermine Future US. Prosperity CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES 2 (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/2-14-13sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4Q4-PCSS].
16. Id
17. See Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 31 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/
state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/ZBB8
4H6T]; Paul Krugman, Fifty Herbert Hoovers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/opinion/29krugman.html
[https://perma.cc/7S52-ULCP].
18. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 6.
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spending on infrastructure, K-12 schools, public colleges, and public health
has fallen short of residents' needs for decades.
These trends form part of a major policy reversal. From the 1940s to
the 1970s, states worked with the federal government to make
investments intended to foster social mobility. Over the last forty years,
however, states have taken a radical turn. Though their populations have
continued to grow, states have stopped expanding institutions that
promote broad opportunity. This choice has almost certainly helped
accelerate the rise1 9 of inequality levels unseen since the 1920s.2 0 Both the
magnitude of this shift toward disinvestment and its consequences raise
profound questions about which forces caused it.
19. Contemporary economic research shows that budgetary austerity increases
inequality. See, e.g., Lawrence Ball et al., The Distributional Effects of Fiscal
Consolidation (Int'l Mon. Fund, Working Paper 13/151, June 2013),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wpl3151.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C28H-W3JC]. This is likely especially the case in U.S. states
because the health, education, and infrastructure programs they have
retrenched are particularly good at minimizing the effects of income and
wealth disparities. The positive relationship between these services and
improved state-level outcomes is well-documented and need not be detailed
here. For some of the most recent scholarship on the societal benefits of
public infrastructure investment, see Emma Hooper et al., To What Extent
Can Long-Term Investments in Infrastructure Reduce Inequality? (Banque
de France, Working Paper # 624, Mar. 2017), https://publications.banque-
france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/wp_624.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Z7Q-G4T6]; for the social benefits of investing in public
K-12 education, see Minghao Li et al., Human Capital and Intergenerational
Mobilityin U.S Counties, 32 EcoN. DEV. Q. 18 (2018); for the social benefits of
investing in public higher education, see Philip A. Trostel, High Returns:
Public Investment in Higher Education, 2008 COMMUNITIES & BANKING 31
(2008) and Michael Hout, Social and Economic Returns to College Education
in the United States, 38 ANN. REv. SoCIOL. 379 (2012); and for the social
benefits of investing in public health programs, see Daniel Kim, The
Associations Between US State and Local Spending Income Inequality, and
Individual All-Cause and Cause-Specifc Mortality: The National Longitudinal
Mortality Study 84 PREV. MED. 62 (2016) and Linda Diem Tran et al., Public
Health and the Economy Could be Served by Reallocating Medical
Expenditures to Social Programs, 3 SSM - POP. HEALTH 185, 185-86 (2017).
20. See Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, The New Gilded Age: Income Inequality







In the mid-twentieth century, state and local governments made
substantial commitments to their residents. The U.S. population grew from
127 million to 216 million people between 1935 and 1975-a more than
70 percent increase.21 .To accommodate the ever-rising number of
inhabitants and. guarantee each the chance to prosper, states expanded
their social policies in nearly every area important to human wellbeing.
First, together with federal agencies, states poured millions of dollars
into the infrastructure that powered the mid-twentieth-century
economy.2 2 Throughout the New Deal, states served as crucial partners to
the federal government in its effort to pull the nation out of the Great
Depression. State and local governments financed upwards of 30 percent
of each project undertaken by the federal Works Progress Administration
(WPA),2 3 the largest public works program in the nation's history.2 4 States
and localities also directly sponsored most of these projects.25 As the
21. See POPULATION ESTIMATES PROGRAM, POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES: JULY 1, 1900 TO JULY 1, 1999 (June
28, 2000), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/
1900-1980/national/totals/popclockest.txt [https://perma.cc/3UEF-XVSG].
22. See JAMES A. MAXWELL, FEDERAL GRANTS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 26 tbl. 9 (1952);
John Joseph Wallis, The Birth of the Old Federalism: Financing the New Deal,
1932-1940, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 139, 147 (1984) (noting that nearly "[a]ll of the
[New Deal's] relief programs ... were jointly financed by federal, state, and
local governments... [and] required explicit or implicit matching of federal
funds for state and local contributions").
23. See ROBERT D. LEIGHNINGER JR., LONG-RANGE PUBLIC INVESTMENT: THE FORGOTTEN
LEGACY OF THE NEW DEAL 63 (2007).
24. From 1935 to its conclusion in the early 1940s, the WPA put more than 8.5
million people to work on 1.4 million projects across the country. The WPA
"built, improved or renovated 39,370 schools; 2,550 hospitals; 1,074
libraries; 2,700 firehouses; ... [and] 1,050 airports.... It also dug more than
1,000 tunnels; surfaced 639,000 miles of roads and installed nearly 1 million
miles of sidewalks, curbs and street lighting...." Andrea Stone, When
America Invested in Infrastructure, These Beautiful Landmarks Were the
Result SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/
history/when-america-invested-infrastructure-these-beautiful-landmarks-
were-result-180953570/ [https://perma.cc/W6X4-VMAL].
As one historian has observed, "a vast amount of [states'] physical and
cultural infrastructure went up between 1933 and 1940 .... [N]ever in [the
country's] history has so much been built for so many...." Id.
25. See KENTUCKY HERITAGE COUNCIL, THE NEW DEAL BUILDS: A HISTORIC CONTEXT OF
THE NEW DEAL IN EAST KENTUCKY, 1933 TO 1943 at 16 (2005); Beverly Bunch,
Planning and Financing Infrastructure in the Trump Years: What Can the
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decades progressed and the nation's economic health recovered, state and
local governments assumed an even greater share of responsibility for
infrastructure financing. By 1960, excluding federal grants, state and local
spending accounted for nearly 70 percent of outlays on infrastructure
projects in the United States.2 6
States and localities also undertook significant investments in
education. This began with an extraordinary increase in public high school
enrollments. Barely 9% of all American 18-year-olds graduated from
secondary school in 1910. By 1940, the median 18-year-old had a high
school diploma and 73% of teens were in a secondary program.2 7 As
Harvard economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz have shown, this
"rising supply of educated workers outstripped the increased demand [for
them] caused by technological advances," leading to "[h]igher real
incomes ... accompanied by lower inequality."2 8 Robust state investment
in elementary and secondary schooling continued well into the 1970s.
According to sociologist Salvatore Babones, "[b]etween 1964 and 1974
state and local governments created more than 2.4 million new jobs in
education" to meet the needs of growing student populations.2 9
To respond to the mounting demand for skilled workers, states also
invested substantially in public colleges and universities. Between 1960
and 1980, states boosted their public higher education expenditures from
$3.56 to $10.42 in tax revenues per $1,000 of personal income-a 193%
increase.3 0 As a result, the number of four-year state colleges climbed from
367 to 465 and the number of community colleges skyrocketed from 328
Administration Learn from Previous Large Infrastructure Programs., in THE
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF WORK AND PLAY 59 (Michael A. Pagano ed., 2018).
26. See Barry Bosworth & Sveta Milusheva, Innovations in U.S Infrastructure
Financing: An Evaluation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 19 (2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/1020_infrastruc
ture-financing-bosworth-milusheva.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD4D-WQ6Q].
27. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 195 (2008).
28. Id. at 7.
29. See SALVATORE BABONES, SIXTEEN FOR '16: A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR A BETTER
AMERICA 19 (2015).
30. See State Investment and Disinvestment in Higher Education 1961 to 2015
at 1, PELL INST. FOR STUDY OPPORTUNITY IN EDUC. (Feb. 2015), http://
www.starvingthebeast.net/Feb%202015%20PSO%20Newsletter-State%20





to 869," accommodating a rise in public enrollments of nearly seven
million students.32
States reaped important returns on these investments. Affordable
public higher education fostered widespread social benefits, including
"higher income, lower unemployment, better health, longer life, faster
technology creation and adaption, reduced crime, greater tolerance, [and]
increased civic involvement."33 Evidence suggests that states likely also
enjoyed a positive fiscal return on their public college and university
expenditures.34
Finally, states committed to provide healthcare for millions of their
poorest residents. In 1965, federal legislation established the Medicaid
program to supply government-financed health coverage for people
receiving welfare assistance. Medicaid was designed as a state-federal
partnership. From its inception, states have taken responsibility for over
two-fifths of the program's funding.35
B. The RetrenchmentAge
Since the late 1970s, states' priorities have shifted markedly.
Residents' needs have remained substantial, particularly as increased
global competition has placed downward pressure on wages and a
premium on higher education. The population has also grown even more
rapidly than in the preceding forty years, from 216 million to 324
31. SeeNAT'L CTR FOR EDUC. STAT., 2012 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, TABLE 306:
DEGREE-GRANTING INSTITUTIONS, BY CONTROL AND LEVEL OF INSTITUTION, SELECTED
YEARS, 1949-50 THROUGH 2011-12 (2012), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/dl2/tables/dt12_306.asp [https://perma.cc/3TSZ-VMYS].
32. SeeNAT'L CTR FOR EDUC. STAT., 2012 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, TABLE 254:
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT FALL ENROLLMENT IN DEGREE-GRANTING INSTITUTIONS, BY
CONTROL AND LEVEL OF INSTITUTION AND STATE JURISDICTION, 2000, 2010, AND 2011
(2012), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl2/tables/dtl2_254.asp
[https://perma.cc/5FRB-VBEX].
33. Trostel, supra note 19, at 31.
34. See JOHN STILES ET AL., CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMIC PAYOFF: INVESTING IN COLLEGE
ACCESS & COMPLETION 6 (2012). Studies have found that a state recoups
anywhere from $2.5 to $7.5 dollars for every $1 it invests in its public, four-
year university system. See Trostel, supra note 19, at 32 (top-left-hand
figure).
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million. Unlike during the Investment Age described above, however,
states' ability to provide high-quality public services has waned
dramatically. This trend has particularly affected four areas of public
investment: infrastructure, K-12 education, higher education, and public
health.
1. Crumbling Infrastructure
State and local expenditures on infrastructure now stand at a thirty-
year low.37 In constant terms, and excluding federal grants, total state and
local spending on infrastructure fell from 3.3% of GDP in the 1960s to
2.1% of GDP in the early 2000s.38 While capital investments on schools,
bridges, and other projects rose from 0.5% to 3% of GDP between 1945
and the mid-1970s, it has since dipped to below 2%.3 As noted above,
these figures are significant because state and local governments finance
three-quarters of the nation's infrastructure.4 0
Decades of neglect have led much-needed airports, roadways, and
buildings to fall into disrepair. The American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) recently gave the country's infrastructure a D+ rating, estimating
the cost of upgrading it at $2 trillion.4 1 These deficiencies highlight the
extent of the need for renewed investment. Despite serving more than two
million passengers a day, U.S. airports face a funding gap of $42 billion
36. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION DIVIsION, ESTIMATES OF THE COMPONENTS OF




37. See Elizabeth McNichol, It's Time for States to Invest in Infrastructure, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 10 (last updated Aug. 10, 2013), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-23-16sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc /2VLW-4BC7].
38. See Bosworth & Milusheva, supra note 26, at 19.
39. Id.
40. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 6.
41. See AM. SOC'Y OF Civ. ENGINEERS, AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 5, 7
(2017), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org [https://perma.cc/B9DS-
NE6S]. The ASCE's grading scale runs from a high of "A" (indicating that
infrastructure is "exceptional" and "fit for the future") to a low of "F"
(meaning that it is "failing/critical"). Id. at 12-13. A "D" grade denotes
"infrastructure [that] is in poor to fair condition and mostly below standard,
with many elements approaching the end of their service life" and whose





over the next decade.4 2 Almost four in ten bridges across the country are at
least fifty years old. Of the nation's approximately 614,000 bridges, over
56,000 are structurally deficient.43 The number of high-hazard potential
dams across the nation has also climbed to nearly 15,500.44
Beyond creating safety concerns, this lack of upkeep has produced
significant economic inefficiencies. According to a 2012 study by the Texas
A&M Transportation Institute, the annual cost of congestion has risen to
$121 billion, or $818 per commuter.4 5 The country stands to lose $14.2
trillion in GDP and 5.8 million jobs by 2040 if it fails to address the
infrastructure investment gap.4
2. Under-Resourced Schools
States and localities have also sacrificed school quality for large swaths
of their populations. Many states have circumvented the minimum funding
guarantees that courts and their constitutions demand.47 These shortfalls
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id.
44. Id at 15.
45. See NAT'L Ass'N OF MANUFACTURERS, CATCHING UP: GREATER Focus NEEDED TO
ACHIEVE MORE COMPETITIVE INFRASTRUCTURE 6 (2014), http://www.nam.org
/Issues/Infrastructure/Surface-Infrastructure/Infrastructure-Full-Report-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5DW-NGW6].
46. See Niall McCarthy, The Massive Cost ofAmerica's Crumbling Infrastructure,
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/
2017/03/13/the-massive-cost-of-americas-crumbling-infrastructure-
infographic/#41a829653978 [https://perma.cc/5RDQ-B4CZ].
47. See EDUC. LAW CTR & THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, CHEATING OUR
FUTURE: How DECADES OF DISINVESTMENT BY STATES JEOPARDIZES EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (2015), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/
reports/Resource-Equity-Report-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBL2-XGJN].
Courts have excoriated states for failing to adequately fund their schools. In
"New York, Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, Washington and many other states,
courts have determined that there is 'a causal connection between the poor
performance of... students and the low funding provided their schools."'
Valerie Strauss, How Grossly Underfunded Are Public Schools." WASH. POST
(Nov. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2012/11/25/how-grossly-underfunded-are-public-schools
[https://perma.cc/G77V-4L56] (quoting Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738,
2003 WL 22902963 (Kan. Dist. Ct., 3d Jud. Dist Dec. 2, 2003)).
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have hit underserved communities especially hard.48 As the Education Law
Center recently observed, "[t]he evidence from across the country is
clear[:] ... our nation must dramatically increase the resources available
for public education."4 9
Throughout the country, states and school districts have deferred vital
funding for school facilities. Research shows that school districts need
high-quality facilities to help "improve student achievement, reduce
truancy and suspensions, [and] improve staff satisfaction and retention
... ."so Yet the 21st Century School Fund recently estimated that states
underspend on school facilities by about $46 billion a year-a 32%
shortfall.5 1 As a result, the ASCE now gives the nation's school buildings a
D+ rating.5 2
Comparative and historical evidence suggests that inadequate funding
reaches far beyond facilities. In 1970, the United States spent an average of
4.5% of GDP on elementary and high school education.3 By 2013, that
figure had dropped a full point, to 3.5%.54 This level lies below the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)
average expenditure of 3.6% of GDP.55 It also falls well short of the
48. See EDuc. L. CTR & LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, supra note 47, at 3. The
highest poverty districts in America now receive about $1,200 less per
student than their more affluent counterparts. Id.
49. Id.
50. 21ST CENTURY SCHOOL FUND AND NAT'L COUNCIL ON SCHOOL FACILITIES, STATE OF
OUR SCHOOLS: AMERICA'S K-12 FACILITIES 3 (2016), https://kapost-files-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/published/56f02c3d626415b792000008/2016-
state-of-our-schools-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANB7-MPWH].
51. Id. at 4.
52. See AM. SoC'Y OF Civ. ENGINEERS, supra note 41, at 81. The ASCE's 2017
Infrastructure Report Card also found that no fewer than 24 percent of
public school buildings lie in "fair" or "poor" condition. Id Overall, 53
percent of public schools need to make investments for repairs, renovations,
and modernizations to be considered in "good" condition. Id. at 82.
53. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2015 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, FIGURE 2:
ENROLLMENT, TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, AND EXPENDITURES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION,
SELECTED YEARS, 1965-66 THROUGH 2014-15 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/dl5/figures/fig_02.asp [https://perma.cc/CT7T-QRZV].
54. Id.
55. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION: EDUCATION





thresholds set by nations recognized as global leaders in education.5 6 In
2013, Finland spent 3.9% of its GDP on schools.5 Denmark and Norway
respectively spent 4.5% and 4.7% of their GDPs on primary and secondary
schooling.8
While data on school districts' shortfalls are hard to come by, research
on individual states paints a concerning portrait. California, the most
populous state in the nation, is a telling example. Scholars estimate that to
bring all schools to the 2011-12 State Board of Education-established
achievement targets under the federal No Child Left Behind standards,
California would need to spend an additional $42 billion a year-the
equivalent of about a quarter of the state's entire annual budget. The state
would also need to hire over 237,000 additional instructional aides and
educators.59
3. Defunded Public Colleges
States have also retrenched higher education. Public colleges and
universities now educate nearly seventy percent of American students.o
Yet states have failed to provide these institutions with the resources
needed to meet growing and more diverse populations.61 Between 1988
and 2013, states decreased their average public higher education
expenditures per full-time-enrolled student from $8,579 to $6,105.62 As
56. See LynNell Hancock, Why Are Finland's Schools Successful? SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Sept 2011), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/why-are-
finlands-schools-successful-49859555/ [https://perma.cc/55A6-ASR6].
57. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STAT., 2016 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, TABLE
605.20: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND




59. See CAL. SCH. BOARDS ASS'N, CALIFORNIA'S CHALLENGE: ADEQUATELY FUNDING
EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2015), https://www.csba.org/
CAchallenge2015 [https://perma.cc/J8JY-FVYJ].
60. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2013 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: TABLE
307.20 (2013), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl3/tables/
dtl3_307.20.asp [https://perma.cc/8K44-8EBL].
61. See John Quinterno, The Great Cost Shif4 DEMOS 2 (Mar. 2012),
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheGreatCostShift
DemosO.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7R7-Z7AN].
62. See STATE HIGHER EDUc. EXEC. OFFICERS, STATE HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE: FY
2013 at 18, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/publications/SHEF
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lawmakers reduced funding for tertiary instruction, institutions made up
for the shortfall by raising tuition nearly four times faster than inflation.6 3
The soaring price of a college degree has caused access to fall rapidly.
Working-class students and families pursuing a degree have found it more
difficult to graduate.6 4 Growing numbers of low- and middle-income youth
have foregone tertiary instruction altogether.6 5 States have thereby
increasingly deprived themselves of the social and fiscal benefits of an
educated populace and workforce outlined earlier.
4. Declining Public Health Spending
Finally, states have restricted their public health expenditures. Though
measuring such spending is difficult due to the complexity of the U.S.
health system,66 recent studies have shown that states' public health
FY13_04292014.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ39-SEMR]. The proportion of tax
revenues states have invested in higher education has fallen even more
precipitously in recent decades. In 1981, states spent an average of $10.47 in
tax revenues per $1,000 of personal income on public colleges. Since then,
that rate has steadily dropped to $5.57-the lowest level in 50 years. State
Investment and Disinvestmentin HigherEducation 1961 to 2015, supra note
30.
63. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2012 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, TABLE 381:
AVERAGE UNDERGRADUATE TUITION AND FEES AND ROOM AND BOARD RATES CHARGED
FOR FULL-TIME STUDENTS IN DEGREE-GRANTING INSTITUTIONS, BY CONTROL AND LEVEL
OF INSTITUTION AND STATE JURISDICTION, 2000, 2010, AND 2011 (2012),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl2/tables/dtl2_381.asp [https://
perma.cc/WE5E-6SAH]. Stagnant wages have aggravated the burden this
shift has placed on the poor; while the cost of attending a public four-year
institution inched from six percent to nine percent of the highest quintile's
family income in the past two decades, the lowest quintile saw this burden
more than double, from 42 percent to 114 percent of their earnings. SUZANNE
METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM 121 (2014).
64. See Jean Johnson & Jon Rochkind, With Their Whole Lives Ahead of Them:
Myths and Realities About Why So Many Students Fail to Finish College 5-11
(Pub. Agenda, 2010), https://www.publicagenda.org/files/theirwholelives
aheadofthem.pdf [https://perma.cc/78SH-GJ57].
65. SeeDonald E. Heller, StudentPrice Response in Higher Education: An Update
to Leslie and Brinkman, 68 J. HIGHER EDuC. 624 (Nov./Dec. 1997); Mark C.
Berger & Thomas Kostal, Financial Resources, Regulation, and Enrollment in
US Public Higher Education, 21 ECON. EDUC. REv. 101 (2002).
66. SeeJonathon P. Leider, The Problem with Estimating Public Health Spending




investments have stagnated in the last ten years.6 7 Data from the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials have revealed that
"[s]tate public health spending [was] actually lower in 2016-2017 than it
was in 2008-2009....6 As with infrastructure and education, this lack of
spending is concerning because state and local governments take the lead
in public health financing; over the past few decades, they have been
responsible for roughly eighty to ninety percent of the nation's public
health outlays.69
C. Toward a New Research Agenda
In short, state spending on public programs has undergone a profound
transformation over the past eighty years. During the first half of this
period, states made remarkable new investments in infrastructure,
education, and welfare services that bolstered economic opportunity for
all residents. Over the last four decades, by contrast, state expenditures in
these areas have fallen short of a growing population's needs by hundreds
of billions of dollars annually.
This structural shift has significant implications for the health and
well-being of the next generation of Americans. By failing to invest
programs that support social mobility 7 0 states risk deepening the record
levels of inequality that already characterize the twenty-first-century
United States. It is therefore crucial that scholars make sense of this
policy transformation's roots and offer legislators actionable solutions.
Doing so will require that researchers look beyond the effects of the most
recent recession. In particular, they will need to dissect the legal and
political institutions that have shaped states' long-run fiscal conditions.
The following sections take the first steps toward elaborating this law and
political economy agenda.
67. See Tran et al., supra note 19; David Himmelstein & Steffle Woolhandler,
Public Health's Falling Share of [US Health Spending 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
56, 57 (2016); Albert Lang et al., A Funding Crisis for Public Health and
Safety: State-by-State Public Health Funding and Key Health Facts 14 (Trust
for America's Health, Mar. 2018), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/
29958/29958.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM77-PVQS];
68. Lang et al., supra note 67, at 14.
69. SeeHimmelstein & Woolhandler, supra note 67, at 57.
70. See supra,'note 19.
71. See Sommeiller & Price, supra note 20.
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II. BRINGING TAXEs BACK IN
There is no doubt that part of the explanation for states' disinvestment
involves competing expenditure commitments. While states' budget
histories remain underexplored, political scientists have shown that the
rising costs of some public programs have crowded out funds for essential
services.72
Chief among these cost drivers is Medicaid. Along with several
coverage expansions, aging and increasingly impoverished populations
have pushed up Medicaid enrollments.73 The program has also suffered
from the outsized cost inflation characteristic of the American medical
sector.74 As a result, Medicaid now consumes an average of one-fifth of
states' general funds, placing intense pressure on other spending areas.75
72. Popular commentators often lay the blame for public service cuts on
government pension programs. In most states, however, unfunded
retirement liabilities mainly pose a future threat See Irvis Lay & Elizabeth
McNichol, Misunderstandings Regarding State Debt, Pensions, and Retiree
Health Costs Create Unnecessary Alarm, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES
(Jan. 20 2011), https://www.cbpp.org/research/misunderstandings-
regarding-state-debt-pensions-and-retiree-health-costs-create-unnecessary
[https://perma.cc/B5UQ-UGEV]. Contrary to misconceptions about the
solvency of public pensions, most state and local governments can spread
the costs of unfunded liabilities over up to 30 years. Id. at 4. Nonetheless,
aging populations and maturing obligations may soon force states to adjust
policies to prevent retirement costs from encroaching on other programs. D.
Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, State and Local Government
Finance: The New Fiscal Ice Age, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 105, 113-17 (2014).
The Congressional Budget Office indeed recently concluded that "[m]ost of
the additional funding needed to cover pension liabilities is likely to take the
form of higher government contributions and therefore will require higher
taxes or reduced government services for residents." Frank Russek, The
Underfunding of State and Local Pension Plans, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 1 (May
2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/
docl2084/05-04-pensions.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AJ9-97D9].
73. SeeKiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 72, at 110-112.
74. See State Healthcare Spending on Medicaid: A 50-State Study of Trends and
Drivers of Costs, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 5 (2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/data-visualizations/interactives/
2014/medicaid/downloadables/state healthcare-spending-onmedicaid.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B39C-6ZBY]. This inflation largely stems from the
lack of a central government insurer capable of streamlining administrative
costs and negotiating lower drug and health service prices. See Gerald F.
Anderson et al., It's The Prices, Stupid- Why The United States Is So Different
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003).




Studies have shown that increased Medicaid spending has taken a
particularly harsh toll on public higher education investment in the past
76
30 years.
Research has similarly found that climbing prison costs form part of
the picture. Between 1972 and 2012, the incarceration rate in the United
States soared from 161 to 707 people per 100,000 residents. Much of
this rise occurred in state prisons, as voters and legislators adopted
stricter sentencing laws for petty offenders and drug users.
Unsurprisingly, multiplying numbers of inmates inflated prison budgets
and drew funds away from public programs.79
Finally, American states and localities have incurred higher
infrastructure costs than other parts of the world.8 0 To take just one
example, New York City's rail extensions can now cost as much as $3
billion per kilometer-15 times the cost of equivalent projects in Paris and
76. See generally David Tandberg, Interest Groups and Governmental
Institutions: The Politics of State Funding of Public Higher Education, 24
EDUC. POL'Y 735, 768 (2010) (finding that Medicaid is area of spending
"siphoning dollars from higher education"); Thomas J. Kane & Peter R.
Orszag, Higher Education Spending: The Role of Medicaid and the Business
Cycle (Brookings Institution, Policy Brief #124, 2003),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/higher-education-spending-the-role-
of-medicaid-and-the-business-cycle/ [https://perma.cc/MUG2-M2R6]
(finding that "Medicaid spending appears to explain the vast majority of
the ... decline in higher education appropriations").
77. See Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve Redburn, Rising Incarceration
Rates, in THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Nat'l Res. Council of the Nat'1 Acad. of Sci., 2014),
https://www.nap.edu/read/18613/chapter/4 [https://perma.cc/RMD4-
QWXH].
78. Id. at 42, 74; Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, State Policy Drives Mass
Incarceration, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
graphs/statedrivernumbers_1925-2015.html [https://perma.cc/7TZD-
H9SS].
79. See Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What
Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. OF JUST. 2 (2012), https://www
.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-what-incarceration-costs-taxpayers
[https://perma.cc/EF4M-T5X7]; David J. Weerts & Justin M. Ronca,
Understanding Differences in State Support for Higher Education Across
States, Sectors, and Institutions: A Longitudinal Study 83 J. HIGHER EDUC. 155,
167 (2012).
80. See Tracy Gordon & David Schleicher, High Costs May Explain Crumbling
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36 times the cost of similar construction in Madrid.8 ' Elevated costs have
almost certainly made it more difficult to get new infrastructure projects
up and running.
Nevertheless, the scale of states' under-investment in public services
implies that other forces are also at work. Even assuming that states
reduced their prison populations and found ways to keep health and
construction prices in check, these savings would not make up for the
decades-long shortfalls that have sapped public programs. The fact that
expenditures have failed to meet populations' needs across most major
budget categorieS8 2 suggests that this is not a story of profligacy in some
policy areas. Instead, this level of uniformity points to a more obvious
culprit: insufficient tax receipts. This section first shows that states have
grappled with two serious revenue challenges in the past forty years. It
then explains that legal scholars have yet to explore these problems
despite being ideally situated to do so.
A. Waning and More Volatile State Revenues
State budgeting is never simply a question of efficient outlays; it is also
about the revenues chosen to pay for them. As Irene Rubin has explained
in The Politics of Public Budgeting state "[b]udgets have to balance. A plan
for expenditures that pays no attention to ensuring that revenues cover
expenditures is not a budget."8 3 For the most part, these revenues come
from state and local taxes. State budgets reveal "citizens' preferences for
different forms of taxation and different levels of taxation, as well as the
ability of specific groups to shift tax burdens to others. The budget reflects
the degree to which the government redistributes wealth upward or
downward through the tax system."8 4
Scholars generally understand that budgeting is a two-fold challenge.
However, many studies examining how, for instance, Medicaid and prisons
81. Id.
82. See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERs, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 2014-16
at 6 (2016), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/
9d2d2dbl-c943-4flb-b750-Ofcal52d64c2/Uploadedlmages/SER
%20Archive/State%2OExpenditure%2OReport/o20(Fiscal%202014-2016)
%20-%20S.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ79-EMH5] (breaking state budgets into
the following categories, most of which-see supra, Section I.B-suffered
significant cutbacks beginning in the late 1970s: elementary and secondary
education; higher education; public assistance; Medicaid; corrections;
transportation; other).
83. IRENE S. RUBIN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC BUDGETING: GETTING AND SPENDING,
BORROWING AND BALANCING 4 (4th ed. 2000).




displace other public programs have foregone a discussion of taxation.8 5 In
doing so, they have intimated that states' resource woes stem entirely
from competing expenditure choices.
A close look at states' fiscal portraits shows that this could not be
further from the truth. States have encountered two major revenue-based
hurdles in the Retrenchment Age described in the previous section. First,
and most importantly, tax receipts have stagnated since the late 1970s.86
Average state tax revenues per $1,000 of personal income climbed from
$34 to $61 between 1951 and 1976 (Figure 1). Since then, however, this
figure has essentially flattened. Average state tax revenues per $1,000 of
personal income reached just $63.15 at the height of the 2007 housing
bubble. As states grappled with the subsequent recession, they allowed
this rate to dwindle to as little as $58.96 (Figure 1).
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85. See, e.g., Kane & Orszag, supra note 76; Albert A. Okunade, What Factors
Influence State Appropriations for Public Higher Education in the United
States? 30 J. EDUC. FIN. 123 (2004); Tandberg, supra note 76; Weerts &
Ronca, supra note 79.
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This shift cannot solely be attributed to exogenous forces such as
slowed economic growth or globalization. Other developed democracies
have avoided revenue stagnation while maintaining healthy economies.
Between 1975 and 2015, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP increased
from 38.9% to 43.3% in Sweden. In the same period, this proportion rose
from 36.8% to 45.9% in Denmark and from 36.1% to 43.9% in Finland.8 8
Greater tax revenues have allowed these countries to continue to invest in
some of the highest-quality public services and education systems on
earth.89 These differences indicate that poorly-designed tax policies have
played a role in impairing U.S. states' budget health.
A second pernicious trend has plagued U.S. states in recent years:
heightened revenue volatility. As the dips on the right-end of Figure 1
indicate, states experienced more severe fiscal stress during the 2001 and
2008 recessions than they did in previous downturns. Studies confirm that
state tax revenues became more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations in
the past decade.9 0 On average, every one percentage point change in a
state's real per capita income elicited a 1.8 percentage point change in its
real per capita tax revenues.91 Such volatility has produced deeper public
service cuts during recessions, lengthened the amount of time needed to
87. See ORG. FOR EcoN. COOPERATION AND DEv., REVENUE STATISTICS: TAx REVENUE AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP (2017), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode
=REV [https://perma.cc/WK6W-XC2Z].
88. Id.
89. See G0sTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 27-28
(1990); Emanuele Ferragina & Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Welfare Regime
Debate: Past Present, Futures? 39 POL'Y & POL. 583, 584-85 (2011); Paul
Pierson, Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in
Affluent Democracies, 43 REVUE FRANCAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE 369, 388-92 (2002);
Abby Jackson, Finland Has One of the World's Best Education Systems.




90. See, e.g., Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, State Tax Revenue Growth and
Volatility 6 FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REG'L ECON. DEV. 23, 27-30 (2010);
Timothy Schiller, Riding the Revenue Roller Coaster: Recent Trends in State
Government Finance, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. Bus. REV. 23 (Quarter 1 2010);
Yolanda Kodrzycki, Smoothing State Tax Revenues Over the Business Cycle:
Gauging Fiscal Needs and Opportunities 1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos,, Working








restore program funding, and impaired leaders' ability to plan for the
future.92
Probing the mystery of states' long-run disinvestment therefore
prompts deeper questions about their tax policy choices. The data show
that stagnant and volatile tax revenue has constrained states' ability to
fund public programs, especially as these programs have become more
expensive. To get at the roots of these problems, legal scholars need to
answer two specific questions. First, how have changing tax institutions
led to increasingly slow and unstable revenue growth in the past four
decades?And second, why did this mismatch between states' tax laws and
their economies arise in the first place?
B. A Gap in Legal Scholarshio
Legal scholars have yet to closely investigate these problems. While
there has been some research on the origins of tax structures, much of it
has remained confined to federal law. Legal writing examining state
institutions has focused on the prospective economic effects of reform
proposals. This opens a space to investigate both how tax laws have
produced unreliable revenue growth and which political forces have
pushed them in that direction.
Most tax experts who have addressed long-term revenue erosion have
focused on the federal landscape. In a landmark study, Michael Graetz and
Ian Shapiro explained how a group of conservative reformers waged a
thirty-year campaign to repeal the estate tax. In more recent work,
Graetz has called for the United States to simplify its tax code and stabilize
revenue by adopting a value-added tax (VAT), like the kind found
throughout Europe.94 Eric Zolt has urged federal lawmakers to update tax
institutions to account for mounting income and wealth inequality.9 5
Finally, Anne Alstott has shown the need to alter fiscal policy in ways that
92. See Tucker Staley, The Effect of TELs on State Revenue Volatility: Evidence
from the American States, 35 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 29, 30, 32 (2015).
93. See e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS (2006).
94. See Michael J. Graetz, VATas the Key to Real Tax Reform, in THE VAT READER:
WHAT A FEDERAL CONSUMPTION TAX WOULD MEAN FOR AMERICA 112 (Tax Analysts,
2011).
95. See Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax and Spending
Policies, 66 TAX L. REv. 641, 641 (2013).
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accurately reflect changing poverty demographics'6  and family
configurations.9 7
For the most part, scholars have not similarly explored the legal and
political changes responsible for states' budget woes. Kirk Stark is one of
the few authors who has embarked on such a project. In a seminal paper,
he unearthed federal laws that have precluded states from controlling
revenue volatility.9 8 Stark outlined a series of conformity incentives,
subsidies, statutes, and judicial decisions that have prevented legislatures
from enacting desirable reforms.9 9 However, even this work did not
examine state legal distortions untethered to federal policy.
Stark's piece has also proven the exception to the trend in state tax law
scholarship. Most work in this arena has begun with a discrete defect in a
state's tax system and elaborated forward-looking reforms intended to
cure it. Rather than look back at how a range of intertwined legal
structures evolved to promote an ongoing fiscal crisis, this research has
built on economic theory to help lawmakers strengthen future state
budgets.
In a separate article co-authored with Brian Galle, for instance, Stark
proposed policies to help states save the money needed to weather
recessions.1 00 Noting the weaknesses of many states' rainy-day funds, their
paper outlined federal legal reforms designed to boost state contributions
and limit unnecessary withdrawals during boom periods.101 Galle and
Stark clearly acknowledged the revenue volatility that states grapple with
at the start of their article. Nonetheless, they centered their analysis on
policy proposals that economics suggests could boost government saving
down the road.
David Gamage has also tackled state-level concerns using economic
principles. In a 2010 article, Gamage highlighted the threat that slow and
unstable revenues pose for states' prosperity.10 2 Using risk allocation
96. See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay 73 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 285, 287-88 (2010).
97. See Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax,
and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAx L. REV. 695, 695
(2013).
98. See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REv. 407,
431 (2010).
99. Id.at423-30.
100. See Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing
State Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 602 (2012).
101. Id. at 619-42.
102. See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal




theory-which focuses on how economic actors can most effectively
spread risk-he encouraged lawmakers to confront instability by
adjusting broad-based tax rates.103 Gamage explained that such rates
distribute risk better than cuts to services because they target wealthy
residents who can absorb their costS.1 0 4 Like his research on state efforts
to tax e-commerce,05 however, this prospective lens left open the question
of which dynamics generated stagnant ax receipts to begin with
Following a similar mold, UC Davis law professor Darien Shanske has
proposed that states stabilize revenues by reviving the property tax. 1 0 6 Ina
2014 study, he underlined that property taxes withered in the last half-
century as states restricted their rates and let them fall out of step with the
economy.107 He thereby outlined a detailed reform plan based on
withholding for individuals paying property tax on residential land.108 Like
the proposals Stark and Gamage put forward, Shanske's analysis primarily
explored the lessons that economic theory holds for aspiring tax
reformers.
These studies are rich in policy prescriptions and have made valuable
additions to the field. From an empirical perspective, however, this
scholarship has left the two foregoing questions largely unanswered:
which legal changes (or lack thereof) engendered stagnant and erratic
state revenues in the past 40 years? Furthermore, why did states' tax laws
evolve in such a way to begin with?
Other disciplines have tried to grapple with these problems. As Section
IV of this paper describes in more detail, social scientists have started to
interrogate the relationship between taxation and social change. Fiscal
sociologists, in particular, have trained their sights on the ways in which
tax systems have shaped poverty and inequality.109 Yet even this
103. Id.
104. Id
105. See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State
Taxation ofE-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 497-516 (2012).
106. See Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Local Political Economy Through
Modernizing the Property Tax, 68 TAX L. REV. 143 (2014).
107. Id at 144.
108. Id at 154-58.
109. See, e.g, ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAx REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY
TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 1-25 (2008); ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX THE ONE PERCENT (2013).
See generally Isaac William Martin & Monica Prasad, Taxes and Fiscal
Sociology 40 ANN. REV. Soc. 331 (2014) (reviewing contributions of "fiscal
sociology" research to the study of poverty and inequality).
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scholarship remains in its infancy.110 It has also mainly focused on nations
or on comparisons between them, rather than on sub-national entities
such as U.S. states. Researchers therefore still have much to learn about
states' tax histories.
Legal scholars have important contributions to make to these debates.
As is true of all facets of capitalist markets,' tax structures and the
outcomes they engender are the product of laws-including state-level
statutes, regulations, ballot measures, and court decisions. These legal
institutions order the economies around which state budgets are built.
Because tax laws are operationalized and enforced through government
power, legal scholars are also uniquely positioned to identify the sites
where political actors contest this authority.
The next two sections are designed to help legal thinkers wade into
these areas. Specifically, they draw on existing work in political science,
sociology, and economics to hypothesize (1) which tax institutions played
a role in limiting state revenue over the past forty years and (2) which
political forces did the most to bring this change about. The hope is that
legal scholars can use these insights as the basis for more wide-ranging
historical studies of particular states, time periods, and tax policies-and
provide lawmakers with concrete reform ideas along the way.
Ill. THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AT THE HEART OF STATES' REVENUE WOES
In order to uncover the causes of states' long-run budget crises, legal
scholars must first grasp which tax institutions contributed to slow and
unstable revenue growth in the past forty years. Recent work in economics
suggests possible answers. As numerous studies have noted, both states'
tax codes and the social environments in which they lie have significantly
transformed in recent decades. At least four legal shifts stand out: (1)
rising Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) and Super-Majority
Requirements (SMRs); (2) withering sales tax regimes; (3) eroding
corporate tax bases; and (4) multiplying tax expenditures. Becoming
familiar with these policy changes will allow legal researchers to test their
importance across particular states, time periods, and budget areas.
Furthermore, once analysts have a clear sense of these shifts, they can they
turn their attention to the political forces that set them in motion.
110. See Martin & Prasad, supra note 109, at 332.
111. See David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REv. 626, 652




A. The Rise of TELs & SMRs
Over the past thirty years, TELs and SMRs have radically altered
states' fiscal landscapes. TELs attempt to limit tax revenue or spending
growth by linking it to an external indicator, such as state income
growth.112 SMRs require a supermajority (often two-thirds or more) for a
legislature to approve tax increases.113 Beginning in the 1970s, a
nationwide "tax revolt" propelled these restrictions into law across most
states.114 Seventeen states adopted local government TELs between just
1970 and 1976.115 Similarly, sixteen states enacted state government TELs
in the four years after 1977.116 Today, forty-six states feature some form of
local government TEL,117 thirty possess state government TELs, and
another fifteen have SMRs in place." 8
These limits come in a range of forms. As the National Conference on
State Legislatures has pointed out, "no two TELs are exactly alike ... [and]
they vary considerably in design, scope and restrictiveness.""9 Though
some state government TELs constrain both revenues and expenditures,
many focus on just one or the other.120 About half of these provisions lie
embedded in state constitutions; the rest are statutory in nature.121
Meanwhile, local government TELs exhibit an even more dizzying array of
characteristics. Experts have generally regrouped them into seven
categories: property tax rate limits that apply to all local governments;
property tax rate limits that apply to specific types of local government;
property tax levy limits; general revenue increase limits; general
112. See Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, State Higher Education
Spendingand the TaxRevol4 77 J. HIGHER EDuc. 618, 618 (2006).
113. Id.
114. MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT, supra note 109, at 1-25.
115. See Daniel R. Mullins & Bruce A. Wallin, Tax and Expenditure Limitations:
Introduction and Overviewr 24 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 2, 3-6 (2004).
116. SeeArchibald & Feldman, supra note 112, at 621.
117. SeeMullins & Wallin, supra note 115, at 3.




120. SeeMullins & Wallin, supra note 115, at 10.
121. SeeWaisanen, supra note 118.
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expenditure increase limits; limits on assessment increases; and full
disclosure (or "truth in taxation") laws.12 2
Understanding how and why these rules were implemented is
important because they have significant real-world effects on state
budgets. While these rules' diversity has made them difficult to study,
evidence has increasingly suggested that they depress state revenues.
Research conducted shortly after the first TELs came into force tended to
conclude that they had little impact.12 3 But as these laws' numbers and
longevity have risen, scholars have demonstrated their influence. Harold
Elder has revealed that TELs have a negative effect on tax revenue growth
after controlling for a range of economic and demographic factors.2 4 Using
panel data for the years between 1969 and 1994, Dale Bails and Maggie
Tieslau have further shown that expenditures remain lower in states with
TELs than in those without them.125 Robert B. Archibald and David H.
Feldman have also found that TELs and SMRs enacted in the past fifty
years have had "significant adverse effects on state appropriations" for
discretionary programs, namely public higher education.2 6
Interestingly, local government TELs seem to have a particularly harsh
impact on states' fiscal fortunes. The U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations has noted that localities rely on large
infusions of state aid for education and infrastructure once TELs come into
law.1 2 7 States, in turn, end up with less room in their budgets for other
services. California provides an instructive case. When residents voted to
cap property taxes and assessment-rate increases in 1978 by passing the
now-infamous "Proposition 13," local governments lost around $7 billion
122. See Mullins & Wallin, supra note 115, at 6; see also Philip G. Joyce & Daniel
R. Mullins, The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector:
The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limitations, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 240, 240
(1991).
123. See e.g., Burton A. Abrams & William R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional
Restraints on Go vernmental Spending 49 PUB. CHOICE 101, 111 (1986); Dale
G. Bails, The Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-evaluation,
49 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 223, 235 (1990); James Cox & David Lowery, The
Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 492, 506-07
(1990).
124. See Harold W. Elder, Exploring the Tax Revolt: An Analysis of the Effects of
State Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 47, 60 (1992).
125. See Dale G. Bails & Margie A. Tieslau, The Impact of Fiscal Constitutions on
State and Local Expenditures, 20 CATO. J. 255, 270 (2000).
126. Archibald & Feldman, supra note 112, at 641.
127. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX AND





in revenue.1 28 State legislators quickly stepped in with emergency grants
to prevent the most severe municipal cuts.1 29 When these proved
inadequate, however, voters passed a proposition mandating that close to
40% of the state budget go to K-12 schools each year-significantly
diminishing discretionary funds available for other areas, such as higher
education and public assistance.13 0
TELs may also indirectly decrease revenue by dampening economic
progress on a broader scale. Taking care to correct for statistical
limitations in previous studies,131 Steven Deller, Judith Stallman, and
Lindsay Amiel have explored TELs' impact using a growth rate model for
all fifty states covering the period between 1969 and 2005.132 Their
"results provide strong evidence that the imposition of increasingly more
restrictive TELs on either state and/or local governments has a negative
impact on economic growth."3 3
Finally, recent research has suggested that TELs aggravate revenue
volatility. As Mathew D. McCubbins and Ellen Moule have pointed out,
localities suffered worse post-recession revenue declines in recent
decades after TELs forced them to substitute unstable income levies for
lost property taxes.134 Tucker Staley has similarly noted a correlation
between more stringent TELs and state revenue instability, after
controlling for a range of economic and political factors.3 5
128. See ALBERT J. LIPSON & MARVIN LAVIN, POLITICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES To
PROPOSITION 13 IN CALIFORNIA 1 (RAND Corp., R-2483-DOJ, 1980),
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA511800
[https://perma.cc/W27F-2AJV].
129. See Nirupama Jayaraman, School Finance in California and the Proposition
96 Guarantee, CAL. BUDGET & POL'Y CTR. 2 (2006), http://calbudgetcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/0604_prop98.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B63-298E].
130. Id. at 2-3; see also CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 98
PRIMER (Feb. 2005), https://lao.ca.gov/2005/prop_98_primer/prop_98_prim
er_020805.htm.
131. See Steven Deller & Judith I. Stallmann, Tax and Expenditure Limitations and
Economic Growth, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 497 (2007); Judith I. Stallmann & Steven
Deller, Impacts of Local and State Tax and Expenditure Limits on Economic
Growth, 17 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 645 (2010).
132. See Steven Deller, Judith I. Stallmann & Lindsay Amiel, The Impact of State
and Local Tax and Expenditure Limitations on State Economic Growth, 43
GROWTH & CHANGE 56, 65 (2012).
133. Id.at79-80.
134. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Ellen Moule, Making Mountains of Debt Out of
Molehills. The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure Limitations,
63 NAT'L TAx J. 603, 604 (2010).
135. See Staley, supra note 92, at 42.
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B. Disappearing Sales Tax Revenue
In addition to imposing revenue restrictions, states have failed to
counteract shrinking sales tax bases. Sales tax receipts make up about one-
third of tax revenue in most states.1 3 6 As such, their deterioration has
significantly impaired revenue growth in the past half-century. On average,
the sales tax base fell from 55% of personal income in 1970 to just 35% in
2010.137
This shift appears to bear substantial responsibility for heightened
revenue volatility. Sales taxes have proven a far more stable source of
revenue than income taxes over time.13 8 However, in the past three
decades, sales tax receipts have progressively lost ground to income levies.
While general sales tax revenue inched from 31.5% to 31.9% of total tax
receipts between 1980 and 2010, the proportion of revenue derived from
personal income taxes rose from 27.1% to 33.6%.139 Had states prevented
the erosion of their sales tax bases, they would have limited income tax
revenues' relative growth and the instability that accompanied it.
Public finance scholar David Sjoquist has tied eroding sales tax
revenue to three legal challenges.14 0 First, states' sales taxes have
continued to exclude nearly all service purchases. This omission has
proven increasingly important as the economy has transitioned away from
heavy industry. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, services
rose from 52.6% to 63.3% of total consumption expenditures between
1980 and 2011.141 State sales taxes have therefore been "applied to a
smaller share of consumer purchases."1 4 2
Second, states have multiplied the number of sales tax exemptions
allowed in their codes. As Sjoquist has noted, "[w]hen sales taxes were first
adopted, exemptions were generally restricted to goods and materials that
were used as inputs in manufacturing process[es] .... " However, in the
past three decades, states have eagerly added one exemption after another
136. See STATE BUDGET CRISlS TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 46.
137. See id
138. See Cornia & Nelson, supra note 90, at 33.
139. See David L. Sjoquist, State Tax Structures: Past Trends, Future Possibilities,
in SUSTAINING THE STATES: THE FISCAL VIABILITY OF AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS
56 (Marilyn Marks Rubin & Katherine G. Willoughby eds., 2015).
140. Id. at 67-71.
141. Id. at 67.





to placate businesses, particularly those in the agricultural and energy
sectors.14 4
Third, until recently, states mostly found themselves unable to take
advantage of rising online sales. The Supreme Court's 1992 ruling in Quill
Corporation v. North Dakota held that states could only force vendors who
have a physical presence within their borders to collect sales and use
taxes.145 As tax scholar Kirk Stark has emphasized, for decades, the
"practical effect of this rule [was] to carve out an area of tax-free
consumption via mail-order and internet purchases."14 6 Recent estimates
have shown that this loophole cost states over $20 billion in uncollected
sales tax revenue each year.14 7
Some states tried to scale this hurdle by enacting statutes that broadly
interpreted the physical presence requirement. These laws took "a number
of forms, such as imputing physical presence when a remote vendor ha[d]
sales affiliates within a state or attributing physical presence whenever a
remote vendor license[d] trademarks to an in-state firm." In the face of
aggressive litigation, however, such legislation proved difficult to
enforce. 1 49 Moreover, as recently as 2012, fewer than a third of U.S. states
actually had such laws on the books.'50
Fortunately for states, in June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
Quill in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.151 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy stressed that "[m]odern e-commerce does not align analytically
with a test that relies on the sort of physical presence defined in Quill" 1 52
He also admonished the Quill rule as an "extraordinary imposition by the
Judiciary on States' authority to collect taxes and perform critical public
functions."s3
144. Id.
145. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
146. Stark, supra note 98, at 430.
147. See Leachman & Johnson, supra note 15, at 5.
148. Gamage & Heckman, supra note 105, at 484-85.
149. See ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RES. SERv., R42629, "AMAZON
LAWS" AND TAXATION OF INTERNET SALES: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 6-9 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42629.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3XL-QS
9Z].
150. See Donald Bruce et al., E-Tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68
NAT'L TAX J. 735, 749 (2015).
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It is still too early to tell exactly how states will react to Wayfair. Many
lawmakers eagerly awaited the ruling to tax online retailers whose
transactions in their states exceed a certain threshold.154 However, Justice
Kennedy was careful to reiterate that the Dormant Commerce Clause
prevents states from discriminating against interstate commerce.5 5
Exactly what such non-discrimination requires will likely form the basis of
future court challenges. In the meantime, both states' policy
experimentation and companies' desire to shape how these taxes are
structured should provide fruitful areas for real-time research.
C. Eroding Corporate Tax Revenue
States' corporate tax revenues have also contracted in the past three
decades. Average corporate income tax revenue declined from 9.7% to
5.2% of states' total tax hauls between 1980 and 2010.156 Strikingly,
corporate income tax revenue nearly halved as a proportion of the
American economy in this period, from $6 to just $3 per $1,000 of personal
income.1 57 Legal structures have again stood at the heart of this trend. As
Michael Leachman and Nicholas Johnson have stressed, "[s]tate tax laws
do not reflect the reality of current corporate structures."158
Three sets of legal institutions stand out. First, corporations have
taken advantage of existing classifications to minimize their tax burdens.
Many smaller entities have chosen to operate as S-Corporations and
Limited Liability Companies rather than as C-Corporations.1 59 This has
154. See Paul Graney, Opinion, States Will Move Quickly to Capture More Sales
Tax in Wake of Wayfair Ruling MARKETWATCH (June 22, 2018, 1:12 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/states-will-move-quickly-to-capture-
more-siles-tax-in-wake-of-wayfair-ruling-2018-06-22 [https://perma.cc/
6WKU.-GNZ6]; David Casper, Laura Robichaud & Sonya Storm, States
Respond to SCOTUS Wayfair Decision, EIDE BAILLY, LLP (Sept 24, 2018),
https://www.eidebailly.com/insights/articles/2018/7/states-respond-to-
scotus-wayfair [https://perma.cc/V2ZM-VUQL].
155. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. Justice Kennedy also looked particularly
favorably upon South Dakota's safe harbor for businesses that transact with
the state in a limited manner; ban on retroactive applications of the sales tax;
and participation in a multi-state agreement hat standardizes tax rules so as
to reduce companies' compliance costs. Id. at 2099-100. Whether these or
other elements will come to be seen as minimum requirements for a
constitutional sales tax on e-commerce remains to be decided.
156. See Sjoquist, supra note 139, at 56.
157. Id. at 71.
158. Johnson & Leachman, supra note 15, at 6.




allowed them to pass profits through to their owners and ensure that they
are only subject to personal income taxation. Similarly, firms have sought
to both convert business income to non-business income for tax purposes
and establish subsidiaries that shield their parent companies from state
levies.16 o State governments have largely stood by as corporations have
made these changes.1 6 '
Second, states have multiplied the tax breaks they provide
corporations in a push to create "business-friendly" climates.16 2 The
Upjohn Institute has estimated that states roughly tripled their business
incentives from 1990 to 2015.163 Though these tax breaks' exact quantity
is hard to pin down, they have had clear effects: on average, states' real
corporate tax rate has decreased by approximately one-third since the
1980s.164
Finally, federal statutes have circumscribed states' taxing authority.
Since 1959, Public Law 86-272 has limited the scope of state corporate
income taxes.16 s The law "restricts a state from imposing a net income
tax... if the only business activity of the company within the state consists
of the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property ... filled
by shipment or delivery from a point outside of the state." 1 66 As tax scholar
Kirk Stark has underlined, uncertainty regarding what qualifies as a "net
income tax" has prevented states from adopting value-added taxes that
would bolster their revenue streams.167 Public Law 86-272 has thus
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D. Multiplying Tax Expenditures
Last but not least, states have increasingly used tax expenditures to
achieve their policy goals. Tax expenditures regroup the exclusions,
deductions, deferrals, exemptions, credits, and preferential rates in states'
tax codes. Because these fiscal levers remove potential revenue from state
coffers, their multiplication over the past thirty years has reduced states'
tax receipts. These laws' especially low visibility has concealed this
revenue drain.
While tax preferences have long existed, the modern concept of tax
expenditures only gained steam after Stanley Surrey and Lawrence
Woodworth published a review of the federal tax code in 1969.168 As
Christopher Howard's seminal studies have shown, federal tax
expenditures became a primary fiscal tool from that point onward,
generating a "hidden welfare state" that escaped public scrutiny and the
political pressures that usually influence social policy.1 6 9 Congress's
embrace of these laws in the 1970s and 1980s put a robust tax
expenditure ecosystem in place. In fiscal year 2015, 169 different
expenditures in the federal tax code caused the federal government to
forego $1.2 trillion in tax revenue-the equivalent of about one-third of
the federal budget.170
States have eagerly followed the U.S. government's lead. States now
spend tens of billions of dollars on tax expenditures each year.17 1 In many
states, these provisions account for nearly half of all public outlays.17 2
Unfortunately, like at the national level, the breadth and depth of states'
tax expenditures remain poorly understood. As public policy analysts
Jason Levitis, Nicholas Johnson, and Jeremy Koulish have stressed, "[t]ax
expenditures usually receive far less scrutiny [than does direct spending].
For the most part, policymakers do not regularly examine tax
168. See Julian E. Zelizer, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social
Policyin the United States, 74 Bus. HIST. REV. 166, 166 (2000) (book review).
169. See e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
170. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-622, TAX EXPENDITURES 1 (2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678262.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU88-2L
LC].
171. See Jason Levitis, Nicholas Johnson & Jeremy Koulish, Promoting State
BudgetAccountability Through Tax Expenditure Reporting CTR. ON BUDGET &






expenditures, nor do states document their effectiveness the same way
they do for on-budget expenditures.
Evidence from individual states confirms that tax expenditures have
altered revenue flows in dramatic, yet under-appreciated ways. Virginia
provides a useful example. Between 1990 and 2009, the state created or
amended more than sixty different tax expenditure programs.1 74 By the
end of this period, these laws were costing the state $2.5 billion a year.175
About half of this amount stemmed from the repeal of an unpopular
vehicle levy rather than from targeted social policy.176 This "car tax" repeal
represented little more than a giveaway by a governor who wished to
curry favor with his constituents.7 In a state that has chronically faced
deficits of up to $1.5 billion in recent years,178 decisions like this one have
proven more destabilizing than supporters likely anticipated.
Indeed, the lawmakers who implement these kinds of rules have only a
vague sense of how expensive they really are. As the Commonwealth
Institute has pointed out, "[1]ittle evaluation of tax expenditures occurs in
Virginia. The state does not regularly report on tax expenditures in any
comprehensive way or subject proposed new expenditures to standard
criteria that might determine whether adopting one is good policy."1 79 Tax
expenditures' obscure nature makes it especially important that scholars
study these laws in the coming years.
E. A New Baseline from Which to Study States' Tax Histories
In sum, economists have begun to develop a clear view of states'
evolving tax regimes. Over the past four decades, surging TELs and SMRs,
173. Id
174. See Michael Cassidy & Sara Okos, A Drop in the Bucket? Assessing the High
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shrinking sales and corporate tax bases, and multiplying tax expenditures
have both constrained state tax revenues and heightened their volatility.
Though there is little doubt that this list is non-exhaustive-and that legal
scholars will need to identify further causes of revenue stagnation-it
provides a starting point from which to dissect the history of states'
budgets.
The analytical categories outlined above remain fluid and intertwined.
Tax expenditures, for instance, have played a large role in diminishing
corporate tax receipts. By curbing lawmakers' ability to align tax codes
with socioeconomic advances, TELs have likely also contributed to
disappearing levies on consumer transactions.
Nonetheless, these groupings provide a useful heuristic through which
to begin examining states' shifting political economies. By probing these
areas in comparative and historical perspective, legal scholars can
rigorously test how institutions have changed over time, how they have
combined to alter particular states' fiscal fortunes, and whether some laws
have held more sway than others across the nation. Furthermore, these
categories offer a baseline from which to answer the second question vital
to tracing the origins of slow revenue growth and public service
retrenchment: why legislators designed state tax structures in a way that
generated negative outcomes to begin with.
IV. THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL CHANGE
Chronicling which institutions have transformed only partially solves
the mysteries of the Retrenchment Age described earlier. In order to make
sense of unreliable revenue growth and propose meaningful reforms, law
and political economy scholars should also ask whytax systems developed
in ways that fostered suboptimal results.
An emerging group of theorists has offered a framework geared
toward these problems. As political parties have become more polarized
and unresponsive to majorities' needs, researchers have moved away from
models premised on median voters' preferences.180 They have instead
sought to make sense of change by placing contested policies at the center
of their analysis-policies like the tax institutions outlined in the prior
section.'8 '
By honing in on specific tax arrangements that have produced
inadequate state revenue, scholars can identify both the political actors
180. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories ofAmerican Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, andAverage Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014).
181. See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, After the 'Master Theory" Downs,





who shaped their configuration and the reasons for which they did so.
Existing evidence suggests that anti-tax interest groups both pushed for
tax cuts and prevented elected officials from revising tax laws to reflect
new social arrangements. Scholars will need to further test this hypothesis
across particular states and time periods in the coming years.
A. Policy as a Contested Arena
According to political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, policy
defines politics because it forms the prize over which different interests
compete.1 82 Policy can confer substantial advantages on particular groups
and individuals. It can also threaten others' very existence. As such, "the
institutional terrain established by significant public policies has a
powerful impact on structures of political organization."1"3 Focusing on
the laws that undergird a policy-and the outcomes these laws mold-can
expose "who organizes, how they organize," and why they organize.18 4
Fiscal policy is a highly desirable prize. As noted above, tax
preferences provide billions of dollars each year to the people they benefit.
Groups that secure lower tax rates in areas that concern them stand to
retain more of their earnings. Politically-savvy actors therefore have a
great interest in shaping tax laws like those described in the last section in
ways that maximize their gains.
B. The Power ofInterest Groups
According to this "policy-focused" strand of political science, interest
groups are the actors best positioned to guide political change.185
Navigating legislative and bureaucratic rulemaking demands broad
sophistication. As Hacker and Pierson have shown, sustaining activity over
the long periods needed to attain policy victories "requires the capacity to
overcome collective action problems, mobilize resources, coordinate
actions with others, develop extensive expertise,... and operate flexibly
across multiple domains of political authority."1 86 These are not often
characteristics associated with individuals. Rather, "[t]hey are the
comparative strength of organized interests."18 7
182. Id. at 648.
183. Id. at 647.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 644-52.
186. Id. at 649.
187. Id
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Existing research suggests that interest groups have played a key role
in reconfiguring state revenue institutions. As Isaac Martin has revealed,
the movement that swept TELs into law across the country in the 1970s
benefited from decades of well-funded opposition to taxes.1 88 Martin has
traced the efficiency with which states adopted revenue restrictions to a
network of groups created to rally for a repeal of the Sixteenth
Amendment, which gave Congress broad powers to levy an income tax."8
The first of these groups formed in response to the Revenue Act of 1935,
which increased income taxes on the wealthy to help pay for the New
Deal.190 By the 1960s, organizations such as the National Committee for
Economic Freedom (NCEF) and the National Taxpayers Union (NTU)
operated full-fledged campaigns to limit governments' tax authority.'9 '
While the 1970s tax revolt was rooted in local fears that rising property
taxes would force people out of their homes,192 this pre-existing web of
anti-tax activists, donors, and lawmakers helped inspire the movement's
rise and spread its message across the nation.1 93
Today, a wide array of state-based organizations promotes an agenda
centered on tax cuts. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Theda Skocpol have
shown that right-wing policy entrepreneurs rely on three resource-rich
groups to pass new laws.'9 4 First, a cluster of think tanks associated with
the State Policy Network (SPN) generates studies and opinion pieces that
advocates can point to when pushing a bill. 195 Second, campaign
operatives paid by Americans for Prosperity (AFP) sponsor forums, rallies,
and television ads to mobilize public support for their cause.19 6 Third, the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) prepares model legislation
and deploys lobbyists to sway lawmakers to vote its way.197
These groups appear to have achieved considerable success in shaping
tax policy in recent years. As ALEC's 2015 Rich States, Poor States urvey
188. See MARTIN, RIcH PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, supra note 109.
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reported, "14... states reduc[ed] their tax burdens in the 2014 legislative
session. This trend continued in 2015, with governors proposing many...
tax and fiscal policy reforms... and many states successfully acting on
those proposals."19 8 Scholars need to more closely explore how these
groups may have altered individual states' fiscal fortunes. Future studies
should also pinpoint the kinds of tax laws upon which these groups have
centered their efforts.
C The Politics of Drift
Focusing solely on active policymaking would be a mistake.
Determined actors can have just as powerful an impact by inhibiting
reform. Hacker has labeled this strategy "policy drift," or "the fine political
art of producing change by doing nothing."19 9 As he has underlined, "[i]n
an environment of new or worsening social risks, opponents of expanded
state responsibility do not have to enact major [laws] to move policy
toward their favored ends. Merely by blocking compensatory
interventions designed to ameliorate intensified risks, they can gradually
transform the orientation of programs."2 00
Grover Norquist's Americans for Tax Reform (ATR), the most powerful
anti-tax group in the country, has relied heavily on drift. With funding from
the country's largest corporations, ATR has spent twenty-five years
convincing state and federal legislators to sign a pledge never to raise
taxes while in office.2 01 The campaign has proven a triumph: by 2011,
thirteen governors, forty of the forty-seven Republicans in the U.S. Senate,
236 of the 242 Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives, and close
to 1,300 state lawmakers had signed the pledge.2 02 As political scientists
Michael Tomz and Robert Van Houweling have shown using survey
experiments, Norquist's pledge has proven remarkably "effective at
198. Arthur B. Laffer, Stephen Moore & Jonathan Williams, Rich States, Poor
States: ALEC-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness Index, AM. LEG. ExCH.
COUNCIL 8 (2015), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/10/RSPS_8th
Edition-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAR5-KDSQ].
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locking politicians into anti-tax positions.2 03 ATR has therefore used drift
to pick up where groups like the NCEF and the NTU left off.
Evidence suggests that drift has profoundly shaped states' revenue
structures. For example, state legislators have become more reluctant to
raise taxes to cope with economic downturns. As recently as the 1990s,
lawmakers remained unafraid to increase taxes to combat recessionary
revenue declines.2 04 However, in the last decade, they have sharply turned
away from tax increases. This shift has both depressed revenue and
lengthened the time needed for budgets to stabilize and recover.2 05
This trend first took hold during the 2001 recession. According to
Elaine Maag and David Merriman, "[r]ather than reacting quickly to
increase revenue when it declined by increasing broad-based taxes, states
enacted relatively few tax increases-and concentrated those increases on
narrowly targeted tobacco taxes."2 06 The pair has shown that states would
have raised approximately $33 billion more in 2003 if they had adopted
the same tax-rate increases between 2002 and 2003 as they did between
1991 and 1992.207
Reactions to the Great Recession were no different. Only a small
handful of states significantly raised taxes to cope with budget
shortfalls.20 8 California, New York, and Illinois alone accounted for 81% of
all new revenue raised between 2010 and 2014.209 This unwillingness to
raise taxes had a clear effect on states' fiscal health. Over this five-year
203. Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, Political Pledges as Credible
Commitments 30 (Working Paper, Mar. 27, 2012), https://web.stanford.
edu/-tomz/working/TomzVanHouweling-Pledges-2012-03-27.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23JT-UKTY].
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Occurs 5, 9 (Urban Inst., Discussion Paper No. 99-04, 1999), http://www.
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period, states collected only an $33 billion in additional tax receipts. This
figure is 38% lower than the total additional amount-$54 billion-that
they levied after the 1990 recession.2 1 0
It is likely that many of the challenges that states face can be traced to
lawmakers' failure to align tax codes with new economic conditions.
Prominent examples include states' decisions not to apply the sales tax to
services or to counter firms' efforts to reclassify their activities to avoid
taxes. The causes of such choices deserve closer scholarly scrutiny in the
coming years. By focusing on fiscally-minded interest groups-and the
tactics they use to promote or deter the adoption of particular tax laws-
researchers have the opportunity to bring this history to the foreground.
CONCLUSION
This Note has aimed to bring attention to an area in need of significant
future research: the legal and political origins of states' long-run fiscal
challenges. For decades, public services have deteriorated in the face of
tightening state budgets. Stagnant and more volatile tax revenues have
significantly contributed to these funding constraints. However, despite
tax laws' effect on revenue patterns, legal scholars have not thoroughly
explored the roots of states' fiscal struggles. Looking forward, scholars
ought to examine which tax institutions fostered inadequate levies over
time and whyrevenue systems evolved to promote this outcome.
Current findings in economics and political science suggest paths
forward on both fronts. With respect to which tax institutions are to blame
for slow and unsteady revenue growth, researchers have pointed to new
tax limitations, withering sales tax regimes, eroding corporate tax bases,
and multiplying tax expenditures. With respect to why tax institutions
have been allowed to underperform, political scientists have stressed the
rise of organized interests that have lobbied to lower state taxes. Fleshing
out these hypotheses across particular states, time periods, and budget
areas will require analyses that place states' political economies in
comparative and historical perspective. Such work can now hopefully
begin on stronger footing.
2 10. Id.
383
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